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Mary LaFrance* 
ABSTRACT 
The shift from record sales to music streaming has revolutionized the music indus-
try. The federal copyright regime, which is rooted in a system of economic rewards 
based largely on sales, has been slow to adapt. This has impaired the ability of cop-
yright law to channel appropriate royalties to songwriters, music publishers, and 
recording artists when the streaming of their works displaces record sales. The Orrin 
G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018 addresses some of the 
most significant flaws in the current system. At the same time, it creates significant 
























                                                          
* Mary LaFrance is the IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law at the William S. Boyd School of 
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. She would like to thank the University of Missouri School of 
Law’s Center for Intellectual Property & Entrepreneurship, and its Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax 
Law Review, for the helpful comments received when an early version of this article was presented at 
their symposium, Scene Change: Innovation in Media and Entertainment Law (March 1, 2018). 
1
LaFrance: Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
Iss. 2] LaFrance: MMA and Streaming 311 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Even as streaming becomes the dominant mode of music exploitation, the fed-
eral copyright regime for music and sound recordings is still based largely on laws 
that were designed for piano rolls and vinyl records.1 At the turn of the twenty-first 
century—as digital streaming began to supplant record sales—songwriters, music 
publishers, recording artists, and record labels urged Congress to modernize the 
system in order to restore the economic incentives for creators and copyright own-
ers.2 Although the creation of the exclusive streaming right (called a “digital audio 
transmission right”) for sound recordings in 1995 was a significant step forward,3 
the unprecedented scale of copyright utilization in the music streaming industry re-
vealed continued weaknesses in the copyright system’s ability to channel lawfully-
earned revenues to the correct rights-holders. These problems compelled rights-
holders to return to Congress in search of more reforms.4 
This article examines the infrastructure behind the flow of revenue from the 
music streaming services to the rights-holders, the flaws that rights-holders have 
identified in that infrastructure, and the extent to which those flaws are addressed 
in Congress’s latest reform: the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Moderniza-
tion Act (“MMA”).5 Part II briefly reviews the music industry’s shift from a physi-
cal-sales-based business model to a streaming-based model, and the parallel devel-
opments in the history of copyright protection for recorded music. Part III identifies 
the emerging issues that led rights-holders to return to Congress in search of better 
protection for their existing rights and new protection for a large group of sound 
recordings that have heretofore been completely excluded from the federal copy-
right scheme. Part IV examines and critiques the key components of Congress’s 
response to rights-holders’ concerns in the MMA. Part V identifies the benefits that 
will flow from this new legislation while pointing out some remaining areas of con-
cern. 
                                                          
 1. See Arthur Chang, Outdated and Ineffective: The Problems with Copyright Law, CLAREMONT J. 
OF L. & PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 11, 2018), https://5clpp.com/2018/04/11/outdated-and-ineffective-the-prob-
lems-with-copyright-law/. 
 2. Kyle Jahner, Trump Signs Music Copyright Bill into Law, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 11, 2018, 11:16 
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/trump-signs-music-copyright-bill-into-law; Jamey 
Tucker, Coalition Asking Congress to Update Music Copyright Laws, WPSD LOCAL 6 (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.wpsdlocal6.com/2018/01/26/coalition-asking-congress-to-update-music-copyright-laws/. 
 3. See, e.g., Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 
Stat. 336. 
 4. See Ari Herstand, What is the Music Modernization Act and Why Should it Pass, DIGITAL MUSIC 
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/08/01/music-modernization-act/; Jor-
dan Bromley, The Music Modernization Act: What Is It & Why Does It Matter?, BILLBOARD (Feb. 23, 
2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8216857/music-modernization-act-what-is-it-why-
does-it-matter-jordan-bromley. 
 5. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018)). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The music industry was a simpler business when it was based on live perfor-
mances, record sales, and radio airplay. In their capacity as copyright owners, song-
writers and music publishers received royalties (called “mechanical royalties”)6 
when their songs were recorded, reproduced, and sold as physical records or, in 
more recent years, as digital downloads.7 When their songs were played in public 
venues, the copyright owners also received public performance royalties, mostly 
through their performing rights organizations (“PROs”).8 Record labels made their 
money primarily from record sales and shared those royalties with the recording 
artists according to the terms of their contracts.9 There were problems, of course, 
when parties negligently or intentionally failed to comply with their legal or con-
tractual obligations, but compliance was not especially difficult for parties acting in 
good faith. 
All of this changed when digital streaming entered the music scene. Instead of 
buying recordings, audiences began to consume recorded music as a service. This 
gave rise to both radio-style digital streaming services—with either random or semi-
customized playlists—and on-demand streaming services that enabled consumers 
to hear their preferred music at the time and place of their choosing.10 When the 
popularity of unlicensed file-sharing caused a rapid decline in sales of recorded mu-
sic starting in the late 1990s,11 songwriters, publishers, recording artists, and record 
labels hoped to replace these lost revenues with licensing fees from digital stream-
ing services.12 
As technological changes have transformed the music industry, Congress has 
periodically updated copyright laws in an effort to maintain the economic reward 
system that sustains the industry. Key pieces of legislation enacted to support this 
effort included the Sound Recording Act (“SRA”) of 1971,13 the Digital Perfor-
mance Right in Sound Recordings Act (“DPRA”) of 1995,14 and the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) of 1998.15 The MMA, enacted in 2018, is the 
latest effort to modernize copyright protection for music and sound recordings.16 
Each of these pieces of legislation will be analyzed in turn. 
                                                          
 6. A mechanical license permits the licensee to record a particular musical composition, and repro-
duce that recording for sale to the public, either in tangible form or through downloads. The royalty paid 
to songwriters and music publishers under this license is called a mechanical royalty. Kevin Zimmerman, 
Understanding Mechanical Royalties, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. (Mar. 28, 2005), 
https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/Understanding_Mechanical_Royalties. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Joy Butler, Music Licensing: The Difference Between Public Performance and Synchronization 
Licenses, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR. (May 16, 2017), http://www.copyright.com/blog/music-licens-
ing-public-performance-license-synchronization/. 
 9. Donald R. Friedman & Frank P. Scibilia, The Recorded Music Industry, in SELECTED CHAPTERS 
FROM ENTERTAINMENT LAW 27 (Howard Siegel ed., 4th ed. 2013). 
 10. STEVE GORDON, THE FUTURE OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS 105 (4th ed. 2015). 
 11. Id. at xxv-xxx. 
 12. Id. at xxxi; Aloe Blacc, Streaming Services Need to Pay Songwriters Fairly, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2014, 
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/aloe-blacc-pay-songwriters/. 
 13. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
 14. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. 
 15. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 16. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018)). 
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A. Sound Recording Act (“SRA”) of 1971 
Until the SRA was enacted in 1971, federal copyright law did not extend to 
sound recordings at all.17 Thus, unauthorized copying and distribution of a sound 
recording (“record piracy”) did not constitute federal copyright infringement. At 
most, a criminal penalty or a civil cause of action might apply under state law.18 
Per the request of the recording industry, which cited a loss of sales due to 
widespread record piracy, Congress enacted the SRA to establish uniform nation-
wide copyright protection for sound recordings.19 The protection granted was min-
imal, aimed only at combatting record piracy.20 The SRA gave the copyright owners 
of sound recordings only the exclusive rights to copy and distribute their record-
ings;21 significantly, it did not give them any exclusive right of public perfor-
mance.22 However, many sound recordings were denied even this inferior level of 
federal copyright protection, since the SRA protected only those sound recordings 
that were created on or after February 15, 1972 (hereinafter “copyrighted sound 
recordings”).23 Recordings made in the United States prior to this date (hereinafter 
“pre-1972 recordings”) received no federal protection, and thus were protected only 
by the laws of individual states, to the extent such protections were available at all.24 
B.   Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 
(“DPRA”) of 1995 
As digital streaming began to displace physical record sales, Congress created 
a limited public performance right for the digital streaming of copyrighted sound 
                                                          
 17. The law on this question was surprisingly murky at the time, since the 1909 Act did not clearly 
address the question. Courts and commentators generally accepted, however, that records were not cop-
yrightable because the musical works they embodied were not visibly discernable; the Copyright Office 
consistently refused to register them. Barbara A. Ringer, Study No. 26: The Unauthorized Duplication 
of Sound Recordings, in STUD. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2-7 (Comm. Print 
1957), www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study26.pdf. 
 18. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (2011) (California’s record piracy statute). 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2–3 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566; S. REP. NO. 92-
72, at 4 (1971). 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2–4; S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 3–4. 
 21. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391. Perhaps because of the focus on 
record piracy, the exclusive right to copy was defined more narrowly for sound recordings than for other 
categories of copyrightable works, encompassing only copying of the actual sounds fixed in the copy-
righted recording, rather than substantially similar imitations of those sounds. 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2018). 
 23. § 3, 85 Stat. at 392. 
 24. Even in states which afford some level of copyright protection to pre-1972 sound recordings, the 
scope of protection may be unsettled. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (1982) (giving the author of 
a pre-1972 sound recording “exclusive ownership therein” until February 15, 2047). For example, the 
highest courts of three states have been asked to rule on whether state law provides an exclusive public 
performance right in pre-1972 recordings. The New York and Florida courts have answered in the neg-
ative. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936 (N.Y. 2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. 
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So.3d 305 (Fla. 2017). A decision by the California Supreme Court was still 
pending as of October 2018. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(certifying question to California Supreme Court). Beginning in 1995, however, pre-1972 sound record-
ings that were first published outside of the United States, in countries that are signatories to various 
international copyright agreements, received federal copyright protection under the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2002)). 
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recordings.25 The DPRA was the initial legislation creating this right, which was 
refined and expanded three years later by the DMCA. This discussion summarizes 
the current regime that defines the rights of record labels and recording artists under 
both pieces of legislation. 
Under §§ 106(6) and 114 of Title 17, satellite radio (e.g., SiriusXM) and radio-
style streaming services (i.e., noninteractive services such as Pandora Free) are re-
quired to pay a statutory royalty for the right to stream a copyrighted sound record-
ing.26 The royalty proceeds are allocated as follows: 50% to the record label, 45% 
to the featured vocalists and musicians who performed on the recording, and 5% to 
the nonfeatured performers (split equally between vocalists and musicians).27 In 
contrast, digital streaming services that allow listeners to choose the recordings they 
hear (i.e., interactive services such as Pandora Premium and Spotify) are ineligible 
for the statutory license, as are those services that enable users to predict which 
songs are most likely to be played.28 Therefore, in order to stream a copyrighted 
sound recording, these interactive streaming services must obtain a license from the 
record label.29 Interactive services are held to this more demanding standard be-
cause they are more likely to displace sales of physical records and digital down-
loads.30 
The DPRA also facilitated the digital distribution and transmission of sound 
recordings by expanding the scope of the compulsory mechanical license for musi-
cal compositions. The Copyright Act has always required record labels to obtain 
licenses from the copyright owners of musical compositions for the right to make 
and distribute recordings of those compositions.31 The labels could negotiate a me-
chanical license with the rights-holder (usually a publisher) or its agent (usually the 
Harry Fox Agency),32 or, for previously recorded works, they could invoke the com-
pulsory mechanical license under § 115.33 Royalty rates for the compulsory me-
chanical license were, and still are, established through administrative proceedings 
before the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”).34 In the DPRA, Congress extended 
the compulsory mechanical license to include “digital phonorecord deliveries.”35 
Although this term clearly encompassed permanent downloads, it was less clear 
whether it also encompassed interactive or non-interactive streaming.36 
                                                          
 25. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 
336. 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002); 17 U.S.C. § 114(f). 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2). 
 28. Id. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i). 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995). 
 30. Id. 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (giving copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute 
their works in phonorecords). 
 32. The Harry Fox Agency (“HFA”) represents its affiliated music publishers in issuing mechanical 
licenses and in collecting and disbursing mechanical royalties. See What Does HFA Do?, HARRY FOX 
AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/what_does_hfa_do.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018). 
 34. Id. § 115(c)(3)(C)-(D). 
 35. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 4, 109 Stat. 
336, 344. 
 36. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, Copyright 
Royalty Board, No. 2006-3 CRB DPRA, 74 Fed. Reg. 4510, (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
385), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1443.pdf (declining to decide this 
question); 17 U.S.C. § 115(e)(10) (defining digital phonorecord delivery); Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory 
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C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) of 1998 
In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA to clarify and limit the copyright liability 
of internet service providers (“ISPs”) for hosting, storing, or providing access to 
infringing material.37 With respect to ISPs that host content provided by users, as 
exemplified by YouTube, the § 512 “safe harbor” largely insulates eligible ISPs 
from liability for storing and transmitting the infringing content posted by its us-
ers.38 Generally speaking, to qualify for the safe harbor, the ISP must implement a 
policy of terminating repeat infringers, and it must expeditiously remove any con-
tent that it knows is infringing.39 Because of this safe harbor, YouTube has become 
the most popular music streaming service in the world—far larger than fully li-
censed services such as Spotify.40 
The DMCA also amended the § 114 statutory royalty scheme to include a wider 
array of digital streaming services and to clarify the definition of interactive ser-
vices,41 leading to the current regime as described in Part B above. 
III. EMERGING PROBLEMS 
Even with these legislative changes in place, streaming services faced signifi-
cant challenges. To obtain public performance licenses for the songs that they 
wished to stream, streaming services were in the same position as terrestrial radio 
stations—they simply needed to negotiate blanket licenses from each of the domes-
tic performing rights organizations (“PROs”).42 However, the streaming services 
had an additional expense that terrestrial radio did not; under §§ 106 and 114, they 
had to pay public performance royalties to the record labels as well.43 
Interactive services faced one more hurdle. Whereas record labels needed to 
obtain only one mechanical license for each of a dozen songs on a typical record 
album, streaming services seeking to build a large enough catalog of recordings to 
                                                          
Licensing of Musical Works in the Digital Age: Why the Current Process is Ineffective & How Congress 
is Attempting to Fix It, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 113, 253 (2008). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 11 (1998). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010). 
 39. Id. § 512 (c)(1), (i)(1). Knowledge can be imputed when the service provider is aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent. Id. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 40. Bill Rosenblatt, Google Tries, Tries Again with New YouTube Music Service, FORBES (May 27, 
2018, 5:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billrosenblatt/2018/05/27/google-tries-tries-again-with-
new-youtube-music-service/#67643069ce2c; Connecting with Music: Music Consumer Insight Report, 
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 5 (Sept. 2017), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-
Consumer-Insight-Report-2017.pdf (YouTube accounts for 46% of all time spent listening to on-demand 
music streams); Hugh McIntyre, The Top 10 Streaming Music Services By Number of Users, FORBES 
(May 25, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2018/05/25/the-top-10-stream-
ing-music-services-by-number-of-users/#6a64b5b35178 (1.5 billion users for YouTube and 170 million 
for Spotify); Hugh McIntyre, Report: YouTube Is The Most Popular Site For On-Demand Music Stream-
ing, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2017/09/27/the-
numbers-prove-it-the-world-is-listening-to-the-music-it-loves-on-youtube/#49a931a16141 (1.3 billion 
people stream music on YouTube, compared to approximately 100 million Spotify subscribers); Anna 
Nicolaou, How Streaming Saved the Music Industry, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/cd99b95e-d8ba-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e. 
 41. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 405, 112 Stat. 2860, 2890–2902 (1998). 
 42. GORDON, supra note 10, at 114. 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). 
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attract and retain subscribers suddenly needed thousands of mechanical licenses.44 
In light of the cost of obtaining the licenses, uncertainty over the legal necessity for 
those licenses (discussed in sub-part B below), and the challenges of locating all of 
the rights-holders in the absence of a reliable database, streaming services in their 
start-up days often neglected to obtain those licenses.45 
As these discrepancies became more evident, songwriters and music publishers 
began raising serious concerns about the adequacy of the existing legislative 
scheme.46 In particular, they believed that the public performance and mechanical 
royalties they received from streaming services were simply too low.47 While the 
record labels succeeded in obtaining relatively favorable royalties from streaming 
services,48 the two largest PROs, ASCAP49 and BMI,50 were constrained by the 
                                                          
 44. Joseph Dimont, Note, Royal Inequity: Why Music Streaming Services Should Switch to a Per-
Subscriber Model, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 680–81 (2018); Todd Larson, Don’t Believe the Hype: Spotify 
Is Right to Challenge Mechanical License Demands for Interactive Streaming, 94 PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. 1466 (2017); Michael J. Perlstein, Music Publishing, in SELECTED CHAPTERS FROM 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW 119 (Howard Siegel ed., 4th ed. 2013); Sarah Jeong, A $1.6 Billion Spotify Law-
suit is Based on a Law Made for Player Pianos, VERGE (Mar. 14, 2018, 12:28 PM), www.thev-
erge.com/2018/3/14/17117160/spotify-mechanical-license-copyright-wixen-explainer; Jody Dunitz, 
The Easiest Way to Fix the Streaming Mechanical is to Get Rid of It, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Sept. 25, 
2017), www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/09/25/fix-streaming-mechanical/; David Oxenford, Copyright 
Office Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking That Could Make Section 115 Royalty Applicable to Inter-
net Radio, BROADCAST L. BLOG (July 16, 2008), www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/07/articles/copy-
right-office-issues-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-that-could-make-section-115-royalty-applicable-to-
internet-radio/; ALLEN BARGFREDE, MUSIC LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 94–95 (Jonathan Feist ed., Berk-
lee Press 2d ed. 2017). 
 45. Ryan Faughnder, Meet the Music Entrepreneur Who’s Taking on Spotify and Other Streaming 
Services, SEATTLE TIMES, www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/meet-the-music-entrepreneur-
whos-taking-on-spotify-and-other-streaming-services/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2016, 9:38 AM); John Paul 
Titlow, Why Can’t Spotify Stop Getting Sued? It’s More Complex Than It Sounds, FAST COMPANY (July 
25, 2017), www.fastcompany.com/40441194/why-does-spotify-keep-getting-sued. 
 46. Ben Sisario, New Way to Pay Songwriters and Musicians in the Streaming Age Advances, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/business/media/music-copyright-digital-ser-
vices.html; Blacc, supra note 12; Chris Leo Palermino, Songwriting Organizations Take to the Senate 
for Better Pay from Streaming, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 27, 2015, 3:23 PM), www.digitaltrends.com/mu-
sic/songwriters-streaming-services-court-battle/; Nate Rau, Music Modernization Act: Eleventh-Hour 
Proposal Could Torpedo Landmark Bill, Backers Warn, TENNESSEAN, www.tennes-
sean.com/story/money/2018/07/23/nashville-group-says-sesac-proposal-endangers-music-moderniza-
tion-act/819721002/ (last updated July 23, 2018, 3:35 PM); Ed Christman & Colin Stutz, Music Mod-
ernization Act Introduced In U.S. Senate After Passing House of Representatives, BILLBOARD (May 10, 
2018), www.billboard.com/articles/business/8455506/music-modernization-act-introduced-us-senate. 
 47. Nat. Music Publishers’ Ass’n, Comments Regarding PRO Licensing of Jointly Owned Works, 1 
(Sept. 22, 2015), www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi22.pdf; Adam Gorgoni, Come To-
gether: Why Songwriters Should Support the Music Modernization Act, BILLBOARD (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8280631/music-modernization-act-songwriters-should-
support-congress-sona; Jack Denton, ‘We’re on Life Support’: Is Streaming Music the Final Note for 
Professional Songwriters?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Apr. 23, 2018), https://psmag.com/economics/is-
streaming-music-the-final-note-for-professional-songwriters; Ben Beaumont-Thomas, Spotify to Pay 
out $112M in Royalties to Songwriters After Settlement, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018, 5:53 PM), 
www.theguardian.com/music/2018/may/24/spotify-to-pay-out-112m-in-royalties-to-songwriters. 
 48. They achieved these rates through direct negotiation with interactive services, and through CRB 
rate-setting proceedings for the non-interactive services. See Andrew Flanagan, Record Labels Welcome 
Rise from Streaming, But Songwriters Aren’t Smiling Yet, BILLBOARD (Sept. 23, 2016), www.bill-
board.com/articles/business/7518839/record-labels-streaming-songwriters-publishers-less-revenue-not-
smiling. 
 49. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. 
 50. Broadcast Music, Inc. 
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terms of their antitrust consent decrees,51 to the detriment of the songwriters and 
publishers they represent.52 These problems are discussed in detail below. 
A. Public Performance Royalties 
Most songwriters and music publishers receive their nondramatic public per-
formance royalties through their PROs, which collect these royalties from broad-
casters, streaming services, and operators of public venues through “blanket” li-
censing of each PRO’s entire music catalog.53 The PROs negotiate the rates and 
terms of these blanket licenses with the licensees. In conducting these negotiations, 
the two largest PROs, ASCAP and BMI,54 operate under significant constraints im-
posed by antitrust consent decrees dating from the 1940s.55 Most notably, if a po-
tential licensee objects to the rates or terms of the proposed blanket license, then the 
dispute must be resolved by federal judges in the Southern District of New York 
(known as the “rate court”).56 Even while a dispute is pending, ASCAP and BMI 
must allow the licensee to use the entire catalog of music, even though the royalties 
will not be paid until the conclusion of the rate court proceeding.57 Most American 
songwriters and publishers cannot avoid the constraints of the consent decrees by 
joining different PROs; the two other PROs in the United States—SESAC and 
Global Music Rights—are not subject to consent decrees, but accept members on 
an invitation-only basis.58 
Songwriters and music publishers were particularly distressed to discover that 
digital streaming services generally pay higher royalties to record labels for the use 
of sound recordings than to songwriters and publishers for the use of the musical 
                                                          
 51. Ira S. Sacks & Ross J. Charap, DOJ Rejects Modifications of ASCAP, BMI Consent Decrees, 
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 9, 2016), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=71689334-51fa-483a-a7c4-
38670b74a30d. 
 52. Brontë Lawson Turk, Note, “It’s Been a Hard Day’s Night” for Songwriters: Why the ASCAP 
and BMI Consent Decrees Must Undergo Reform, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 493, 
495–96 (2016); David Oxenford, The Summer of Copyright Part 4 – The Department of Justice Reviews 
the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees – What Should Broadcasters and Music Services Know?, 
BROADCAST L. BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), www.broadcastlawblog.com/2014/08/articles/the-summer-of-
copyright-part-4-the-department-of-justice-reviews-the-ascap-and-bmi-consent-decrees-what-should-
broadcasters-and-music-services-know/. 
 53. Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
 54. Perlstein, supra note 44, § 2.7; DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
MUSIC BUSINESS 201 (7th ed. 2009). 
 55. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 
1589999, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 
WL 901652, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994). See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Consent Decree Review 
– ASCAP and BMI 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: ANTITRUST DIV., https://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-
bmi-decree-review (last updated Dec. 16, 2015). 
 56. Buffalo Broad. Co., 744 F.2d at 923; GORDON, supra note 10, at 124. 
 57. GORDON, supra note 10, at 15; BARGFREDE, supra note 44, at 43; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 94 (2015) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC 
MARKETPLACE]. 
 58. SESAC, www.sesac.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2018); Paul Resnikoff, A Comprehensive Compari-
son of Performance Rights Organizations (PROs) in the US, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), 
www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/02/20/performance-rights-pro-ascap-bmi-sesac-soundexchange/. 
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works themselves.59 However, they were precluded from using this disparity to ar-
gue for higher royalties in rate court proceedings because § 114(i) prohibited sound 
recording royalties from being considered in any governmental, judicial, or admin-
istrative proceeding to determine the appropriate rate of public performance royal-
ties for musical works.60 When publishers attempted to withdraw digital perfor-
mance rights from their PROs to engage in direct licensing with streaming services, 
the Second Circuit ruled that this was not permitted by the consent decrees, and the 
Department of Justice refused to modify this aspect of the decrees.61 This left pub-
lishers and songwriters frustrated with their inability to command performance roy-
alties comparable to those received by the record labels. 
B. Mechanical Royalties 
In the past, it has not been entirely clear whether streaming services are re-
quired to pay mechanical royalties to the copyright owners of musical compositions, 
because no court has ruled definitively on whether streaming transmissions, as op-
posed to permanent or tethered downloads, implicate the reproduction right.62 
While some interactive streaming services have paid for compulsory mechanical 
licenses pursuant to § 115, Spotify faced and settled massive lawsuits for its failure 
to pay.63 
Although Spotify questioned whether mechanical licenses were required for 
streaming,64 its chief excuse for failing to pay the licensing fee was the difficulty of 
identifying and locating the copyright owners.65 When Spotify exercises its § 115 
digital phonorecord delivery rights by adding a recording to its streaming repertoire, 
it does not necessarily know the identity of the rights-holders. For example, if a 
copyright owner is not affiliated with the Harry Fox Agency, it may be difficult for 
a streaming service to identify and locate the owner.66 Although metadata that iden-
tifies copyright owners, as well as the other rights-holders and creative participants, 
                                                          
 59. Flanagan, supra note 48; Annie Lin, Music Publishing’s Metadata Problem, HYPEBOT.COM (July 
30, 2015), www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2015/07/music-publishings-metadata-problemdraft.html. 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 114(i) (2018). Congress originally enacted this provision based on the songwriters’ 
and publishers’ concern that, in rate court proceedings, streaming services would cite their new obliga-
tion to pay royalties to record companies as an argument for reducing the royalties payable for the mu-
sical works. 
 61. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 785 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 
2015); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE ON THE CLOSING OF THE ANTITRUST 
DIVISION’S REVIEW OF ASCAP AND BMI CONSENT DECREES 2–3 (2016); see also Steven J. Gagliano, 
Comment, Consent Decrees in the Streaming Era: Digital Withdrawal, Fractional Licensing, and § 
114(i), 10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 317, 321–22 (2017). 
 62. Larson, supra note 44, at 1. 
 63. Robert Levine, Spotify Settles Class Action Lawsuits Filed by David Lowery and Melissa Ferrick 
with $43.4 Million Fund, BILLBOARD (May 26, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/busi-
ness/7809561/spotify-settles-class-action-lawsuits-filed-by-david-lowery-and-melissa. 
 64. Ed Christman, Spotify, Bluewater, & Mechanical Licensing: What’s Really Driving the Streaming 
Giant’s Latest Legal Fight, BILLBOARD (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/busi-
ness/7950194/spotify-bluewater-mechanical-licensing-latest-legal-fight. 
 65. Ari Herstand, Why Exactly is Spotify Being Sued and What Does This Mean?, DIGITAL MUSIC 
NEWS (Dec. 30, 2015), www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/12/30/why-exactly-is-spotify-being-sued-
and-what-does-this-mean/. 
 66. RETHINK MUSIC INITIATIVE, FAIR MUSIC: TRANSPARENCY AND PAYMENT FLOWS IN THE MUSIC 
INDUSTRY 18 (2015), http://www.rethink-music.com/research/fair-music-transparency-and-payment-
flows-in-the-music-industry. 
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can easily be embedded in digital music files, data is frequently missing or inaccu-
rate.67 The record labels have no legal obligation—and arguably little incentive—
to address the problem.68 Even when accurate data is included, the formats are not 
always standardized, making it difficult to track what is being streamed and who 
should be compensated.69 
Even if the metadata embedded in a recording is initially accurate, the copy-
right ownership of a musical composition embedded in a particular recording may 
change over time as songwriters terminate their publishers’ contracts and reassign 
the rights to new publishers; the same is true when publishers assign their catalogs 
to new owners or successors in interest.70 To complicate matters, multiple publish-
ers may each own fractional shares of a song.71 Thus, the information about rights-
holders contained in the embedded metadata may be difficult to collect initially and 
then may cease to be accurate over time. 
The most promising solution to the metadata problem is the creation of a single 
database to collect and maintain all metadata for every sound recording and musical 
composition in a way that is accessible to all rights-holders and actual or potential 
licensees. The challenges this solution presents are (1) determining how to require 
the parties who possess the relevant information to contribute it to the database and 
(2) determining who will be responsible for funding, maintaining, and performing 
the necessary updates to the database to ensure continued accuracy of its contents.
  
In the United States and Europe, there have been several unsuccessful attempts 
to create such databases.72 Typically, these failures stemmed from the participants’ 
inability to agree on how to control the database or what technological standards 
                                                          
 67. Corey Denis, The Global Dissonance & Disruption Of Music Metadata, TAG STRATEGIC (Aug. 
31, 2011), www.tagstrategic.com/the-global-dissonance-disruption-of-music-metadata; Kiran George, 
Royalties in the Digital Music Industry: The Metadata Predicament, SPICY IP (May 12, 2016), 
spicyip.com/2016/05/royalties-in-the-digital-music-industry-the-metadata-predicament.html; Eddie 
Moses, The Metadata Race: A Contest That Record Labels Can Win, HYPEBOT.COM (May 31, 2017), 
www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2017/05/the-metadata-race-one-record-labels-can-win.html. See, e.g., Mi-
chael Lavorgna, Neil Young’s Americana & the Case of the Missing Metadata, AUDIO STREAM (June 
12, 2012), http://www.audiostream.com/content/neil-youngs-americana-case-missing-metadata. 
 68. Spotify is now experimenting with “crowd-sourcing” metadata from its users. Janko Roettgers, 
Spotify Enlists Its Users to Add Music Metadata, VARIETY (Mar. 12, 2018), http://variety.com/2018/dig-
ital/news/spotify-line-in-music-metadata-1202723757.  
 69. Solveig Whittle, The Future of Music is Standardized Metadata, SHADES OF SOLVEIG (Nov. 1, 
2013), http://www.shadesofsolveig.com/2013/11/01/future-music-metadata/; see also Music Metadata 
Style Guide, MUSIC BUS. ASS’N 2 (2016), http://musicbiz.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mu-
sicMetadataStyleGuide-MusicBiz-FINAL2.0.pdf (proposing metadata standards). 
 70. Annie Lin, Music Publishing’s Metadata Problem, HYPEBOT.COM (Jul. 30, 2015), 
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2015/07/music-publishings-metadata-problemdraft.html. 
 71. United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 16-3830-CV, 2017 WL 6463063, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 
19, 2017) (discussing that licensees must pay mechanical royalties to each publisher in accordance with 
that publisher’s share of the song. Although the Department of Justice attempted to impose a new prac-
tice of 100% licensing at the time it reviewed the consent decrees, the Second Circuit rejected that inter-
pretation of the decrees, and held that fractional licensing was permissible). 
 72. See Klementina Milosic, The Failure of the Global Repertoire Database, HYPEBOT.COM (Aug. 
31, 2015), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2015/08/the-failure-of-the-global-repertoire-database-ef-
fort-draft.html. Several PROs in the U.S. and Europe formed the International Music Joint Venture in 
2000, but never succeeded in producing the database. In 2009, the European Commission established 
the Global Repertoire Database Working Group, but the effort collapsed in 2014. The World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) undertook to create the International Music Registry in 2011, but this 
effort failed as well. 
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should be employed; these disagreements led key stakeholders to stop participating 
and to withdraw funding.73 Several new efforts were announced in 2017.74 
In addition to the failure of interactive streaming services to deliver mechanical 
royalties to the correct rights-holders, songwriters and publishers complained that 
the formula used by the CRB resulted in compulsory mechanical royalties that were 
too low.75 In the past, the CRB used a complicated formula based largely on the 
revenues of the interactive service.76 While this approach may have been appropri-
ate when streaming services were start-ups that generated relatively small revenues, 
songwriters and publishers argued that rights-owners should no longer be expected 
to subsidize these operations.77 At the same time, record labels have negotiated rel-
atively favorable deals with interactive services, receiving significant advances and, 
in some cases, equity interests in addition to the royalties received from those ser-
vices.78 Even the statutory royalties that non-interactive services pay to record la-
bels have borne a closer resemblance to fair market value than the compulsory me-
chanical royalties paid by the same services.79 This created a significant disparity 
between the amounts paid to record labels and the amounts paid to the copyright 
owners of the musical works.80 
However, songwriters and publishers reacted positively to a 2018 ruling from 
the CRB, which significantly changed the formula for calculating the compulsory 
mechanical royalty that must be paid by interactive streaming services, including 
Apple, Amazon, Google, Spotify, and Pandora.81 Instead of basing the royalty on 
the revenues of the streaming service from 2018 to 2022, the royalty will be based 
on the greater of (1) a percentage of the service’s revenues or (2) a percentage of 
                                                          
 73. Id. 
 74. ASCAP and BMI announced that they would combine their music databases. Daniel Sanchez, 
ASCAP and BMI Just Made the Biggest Commitment Yet to a Shared Licensing Database, DIGITAL 
MUSIC NEWS (Jul. 26, 2017), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/07/26/ascap-bmi-music-data-
base/. ASCAP and two foreign PROs—SACEM in France and PRS For Music in the United Kingdom—
announced a joint project using blockchain technology to link International Sound Recording Codes 
(ISRCs) with International Standard Work Codes (ISWCs) in order to match musical compositions with 
the recordings that embody them. See Richard Smirke, ASCAP, SACEM and PRS For Music Team Up 
on Initiative to Improve Royalty Collection, BILLBOARD (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/ar-
ticles/business/7752442/ascap-sacem-prs-for-music-initiative-improve-royalty-collection. 
 75. NMPA To Begin Copyright Royalty Board Proceedings for Streaming Mechanical Royalty Rates, 
ASCAP (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.ascap.com/news-events/articles/2017/03/nmpa-crb-message-to-
mbrs [hereinafter ASCAP]; Casey Rae, Where’s My Mechanicals? The Ultimate Explainer, FUTURE OF 
MUSIC COAL. (Nov. 11, 2015), https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2015/11/11/wheres-my-mechanicals-ulti-
mate-explainer. 
 76. Perlstein, supra note 44, §2.6; BARGFREDE, supra note 44, at 94. 
 77. Paula Parisi, Copyright Royalty Board Boosts Songwriters’ Streaming Pay Nearly 50%, VARIETY 
(Jan. 27, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/copyright-royalty-board-boosts-song-
writers-streaming-pay-nearly-50-1202679118/; ASCAP, supra note 75. 
 78. Bloomberg News, Record Labels Reap More Than $1 Billion Selling Spotify Stakes, AD AGE (May 
7, 2018), http://adage.com/article/digital/record-labels-reap-1b-selling-spotify-stakes/313408/; Chris 
DeVille, Leaked Spotify Contract Reveals Sony’s Streaming Rates, Advances, STEREOGUM (May 19, 
2015, 2:29 PM), http://www.stereogum.com/1802820/leaked-spotify-contract-reveals-sonys-streaming-
rates-advances/news/. 
 79. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 81.  
 80. Id. at 136. 
 81. Rates and Terms for Use of Nondramatic Musical Works in the Making and Distributing of Phys-
ical and Digital Phonorecords, Attachment A, § 385.21, No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–2022), 
https://crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/attachment-a-part-385-regs.pdf [hereinafter Phonorecords]; Peti-
tions to Participate, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD. https://crb.gov/proceedings/16-crb-0003/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2018). 
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its “total cost of content,” which refers to the amounts paid to record labels for the 
right to stream the recordings.82 Since the “total cost of content” measure will usu-
ally generate the larger payment, the new formula is expected to increase mechani-
cal royalties significantly.83 The CRB also imposed a significant late fee on services 
that fail to pay the copyright owners on time.84 While songwriters and publishers 
had hoped for a fixed per-stream rate,85 the new formula has been well received.86  
As discussed in Part IV.A. below, new legislation now promises greater parity be-
tween the mechanical royalties paid to songwriters and publishers and those paid to 
record labels for the right to stream their works. 
IV. THE ORRIN G. HATCH-BOB GOODLATTE MUSIC MODERNIZATION 
ACT 
The MMA87 makes significant changes to the federal laws governing sound 
recordings. The most significant of these changes are found in Titles I and II of the 
Act.88 Title I, the Musical Works Modernization Act (“MWMA”),89 addresses me-
chanical and public performance royalties for digital streaming of musical compo-
sitions.90 Title II, the CLASSICS Protection and Access Act (the “CLASSICS 
Act”),91 creates the near-equivalent of full federal copyright protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings.92 
                                                          
 82. In Re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords 
(Phonorecords III), Docket No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018-22), Attachment A §§ 385.2, 385.21; Parisi, 
supra note 77. 
 83. See, e.g., Glenn Peoples, Songwriters Win Victory on Streaming Royalty Increase, But How?, 
POLLSTAR (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.pollstar.com/article/songwriters-win-victory-on-
streaming-royalty-increase-but-how-134415. 
 84. Phonorecords, supra note 81, § 385.21(b); Parisi, supra note 77. 
 85. Phonorecords, supra note 81, § 385.3. 
 86. Parisi, supra note 77. 
 87. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 
[hereinafter MMA]. Because Congress hastily rewrote large portions of the MMA shortly before its 
passage, there was no Conference Committee Report. One week after the law’s enactment, however, 
Representative Goodlatte released a short explanation of the legislation. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
115TH CONG., H.R. 1551, THE MUSIC MODERNIZATION ACT (2018) [hereinafter H.R. 1551, THE MUSIC 
MODERNIZATION ACT] https://copyright.gov/legislation/mma_conference_report.pdf. 
 88. Title III, the Allocation for Music Producers (AMP) Act, authorizes SoundExchange, the nonprofit 
organization that collects and distributes statutory royalties under § 114, to accept instructions from a 
recording artist payee to allocate a portion of the artist’s royalties to a producer, mixer, or sound engineer 
that worked on the recording, because one or more of those parties may have made significant creative 
contributions to the recording. Id. § 302. 
 89. Id. § 101. 
 90. See infra Part IV.A. 
 91. MMA § 201. The acronym CLASSICS stands for the cumbersome phrase “Compensating Legacy 
Artists for their Songs, Services, and Important Contributions to Society.” Marsha Silva, U.S. Senate 
Initiates the CLASSICS Act to Finally Get Oldies Artists Paid, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 8. 2018), 
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/02/08/classics-act-copyright-oldies/. 
 92. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. Title I: The Musical Works Modernization Act 
The MWMA requires interactive streaming services to obtain mechanical li-
censes for musical works embodied in the recordings they stream;93 thus, it elimi-
nates any uncertainty as to whether such licenses are required. Further, it confirms 
that these services may utilize the § 115 compulsory license, but it subjects them to 
rules and procedures that differ from those applicable to record labels. Under prior 
law, a compulsory license for interactive streaming of a musical work was available 
only with respect to nondramatic musical compositions that had previously been 
recorded and distributed to the public on phonorecords.94 However, the MWMA 
broadens § 115 by allowing an interactive streaming service to obtain a compulsory 
license for a nondramatic musical composition that has not previously been distrib-
uted on phonorecords.95 As under prior law, the compulsory license still applies 
only if the sound recording was made with the consent of the musical work’s cop-
yright owner.96 In addition, the copyright owner of the sound recording must have 
the authority to distribute it digitally, and must have authorized the streaming ser-
vice to do so.97 
To facilitate compulsory licensing of streaming services, the MWMA author-
izes the copyright owners of musical works to form a nonprofit mechanical licens-
ing collective that will (1) issue blanket mechanical licenses to digital music ser-
vices, (2) collect those mechanical royalties, and (3) distribute the royalties to the 
copyright owners.98 In the past, a digital music service seeking a § 115 license could 
file its notice of intent with the Copyright Office, and if the service could not iden-
tify the copyright owner of the musical work, it frequently failed to pay the statutory 
royalty.99 To remedy this, the MWMA requires interactive streaming services to 
serve notice on the mechanical licensing collective—not on the Copyright Office.100 
Therefore, even if the streaming service cannot identify the copyright owner(s) or 
determine their respective royalty shares, it must still pay the mechanical royalty to 
the licensing collective.101 Then, the collective itself will undertake the task of iden-
tifying the copyright owners and, in the case of a jointly owned work, determining 
each owner’s share.102 Copyright owners will also have the right to audit the collec-
tive’s records.103 
For the new mechanical licensing collective to allocate these royalties to the 
correct copyright owners, it will need an accurate database that identifies the  cop-
yright owners of the musical works embodied in each recording, just as                                                           
 93. MMA § 102 (2018) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4)(B) (2018)). The mechanical license re-
quirement applies to “digital phonorecord deliveries,” which the MWMA defines to include interactive 
streaming as well as downloads, but not non-interactive (radio-style) streaming. 17 U.S.C. § 115(e)(10), 
(13). It also does not apply to exempt transmissions under § 114(d)(1), such as “canned” music services. 
Id. § 115(e)(13). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). 
 95. MMA § 102(a)(1)(B) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A)(ii)). 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(1)(A)(ii)(I). 
 97. Id. § 115 (a)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II). 
 98. MMA § 102(a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(2)-(3)). 
 99. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 100. MMA § 102(a)(2) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(2)). Until the mechanical licensing collective 
is operational, notice must be served on the copyright owner.  
 101. MMA § 102 (a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (d)(4)). 
 102. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(C)). 
 103. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(L)). 
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SoundExchange needs an accurate database of the featured performers on those 
sound recordings.104 To accomplish this, the MWMA charges the new mechanical 
licensing collective with creating and maintaining a database that identifies (1) the 
musical works embodied in individual sound recordings, (2) the copyright owners 
of those musical works, (3) the respective ownership shares of each of those copy-
right owners, and (4) contact information for each of the owners.105 With respect to 
both the musical works and the sound recordings that embody them, the database 
must include, to the extent possible, the international standard codes that uniquely 
identify those works.106 In addition, the database will be available to the public at 
no charge in a searchable online format.107 
Like SoundExchange, but unlike the PROs, the mechanical licensing collective 
will not set the royalty rates for the licenses it administers.108 Instead, the CRB will 
continue to set the rates and terms for the streaming services’ compulsory mechan-
ical licenses,109 although the new collective will provide documentation for the 
Board to consider in these proceedings.110 
Under the prior version of § 115, a record label that obtained a compulsory 
license for a particular musical work could transmit, or authorize another party to 
transmit, the resulting recording by either downloading or interactive streaming.111 
This was referred to as a “pass-through” license.112 Songwriters and publishers com-
plained that the pass-through license required them to collect their digital mechan-
ical royalties from the record companies rather than directly from the streaming 
services, making it more difficult for them to determine if they were receiving ap-
propriate royalties based on the usage of their work.113 The MWMA revises § 115 
to clarify that pass-through compulsory licenses are not available for interactive 
streaming, although they can still be used for permanent downloads.114 
In a significant change that is likely to increase the mechanical royalties paya-
ble to songwriters and music publishers, the MWMA requires the CRB to use a 
“willing buyer/willing seller” (i.e., fair market value) standard to determine the § 
115 compulsory mechanical royalty rate.115 Prior law required the CRB to set a 
“reasonable” rate,116 where reasonableness was determined by the rate’s ability to 
achieve four objectives: “(1) maximizing public availability of creative works, (2) 
                                                          
 104. SOUNDEXCHANGE, https://isrc.soundexchange.com/#!/search (last visited Sept. 13, 2018). 
SoundExchange’s searchable database of sound recordings is publicly available. 
 105. MMA § 102(a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(E)). 
 106. Id. These codes would include the International Standard Musical Work Code (ISWC), which 
identifies a specific musical composition, and the International Standard Recording Code (ISRC), which 
identifies a specific sound recording. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(a) (2018) (pre-MMA); S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 7 (1995); Section 115 of the 
Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intel-
lectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7–8 (2004) (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyrights), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031104.pdf; COPYRIGHT AND 
THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 131–32; see also id. at 166 (recommending allowing music 
publishers to opt out of the compulsory license with respect to interactive streaming and downloads). 
 112. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 131–32. 
 113. Id. 
 114. MMA § 102(a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 115(b)(3), (e)(12)). 
 115. Id. § 102(a) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F)). 
 116. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C) (pre-MMA); 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2018) (pre-MMA). 
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giving the copyright owner a fair return and the licensee a fair income, (3) reflecting 
the copyright owner and licensee’s relative roles in making the product available to 
the public,117 and (4) minimizing disruption of the industries involved and generally 
prevailing industry practices.”118  
In contrast, the § 114 royalty received by record labels and recording artists for 
non-interactive streaming services is determined under a “willing buyer/willing 
seller” standard119 that more closely resembles a fair market value rate.120 For inter-
active streaming, no statutory royalty applies to sound recordings, enabling record 
labels to negotiate for market rates.121 Recording artists, in turn, can negotiate with 
their record labels for a share of the interactive streaming royalty.122 Songwriters 
and publishers complained that this rate-setting discrepancy resulted in songwriters 
and publishers receiving lower returns than record labels and recording artists.123 
The MWMA’s switch to the willing buyer/willing seller standard for mechanical 
royalties should help to assuage these concerns. 
In addition to shifting the § 115 royalty for streaming to something closer to a 
market rate, the MWMA also addresses the discrimination in § 114 sound recording 
performance royalties between older and newer non-interactive streaming services. 
Under the previous § 114 statutory royalty scheme, older digital music services such 
as SiriusXM, Muzak, and Music Choice124 paid record companies and recording 
artists a lower royalty rate than newer comparable services such as Pandora.125 Two 
decades later, that preferential treatment—and its impact on rights-holders and the 
newer competing music services—was no longer warranted.126 Accordingly, the 
MWMA applies the same willing buyer/willing standard to all non-interactive li-
censees.127 
The MWMA also changes the rules that govern the rate court’s oversight of the 
blanket license fees charged by ASCAP and BMI for public performances of musi-
cal works by streaming services.128 In the past, § 114(i) prohibited the rate court 
from considering the royalties paid by streaming services to the rights-holders of 
sound recordings.129 Although § 114(i) was intended to prevent the sound recording 
performance royalties from having a depressing effect on the performance royalties 
                                                          
 117. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(C) (pre-MMA) (giving consideration to creative and technological contri-
butions, capital investment, cost, risk, and “contribution to the opening of new markets for creative ex-
pression and media for their communication.”). 
 118. Id. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2018) (pre-MMA). 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2018). Prior to the MMA, the older digital services – SiriusXM, Muzak, 
and Music Choice – were exceptions to this rule, and were governed by the same rate-setting standard 
as § 115. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(a) (pre-MMA); COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 
57, at 81. 
 120. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 81. 
 121. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i). 
 122. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1). 
 123. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 82–83, 135–37. 
 124. John Villasenor, Digital Music Broadcast Royalties: The Case for a Level Playing Field, ISSUES 
IN TECH. INNOVATION 4 (Aug. 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/CTI_19_Villasenor.pdf. This category includes services that were already in existence 
when the DMCA was enacted. 
 125. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1); see also PASSMAN, supra note 54, at 119.   
 126. H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 14 (2018) (commenting on a similar provision in §103(a) of H.R. 5447, 
a predecessor of the MMA); Villasenor, supra note 124, at 12–13. 
 127. MMA § 103(a)(1) (2018). 
 128. Id. § 103(b)-(c). 
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 114(i). 
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paid for musical works (because streaming services might argue that the cumulative 
effect of both royalties was excessive),130 in practice the sound recording royalties 
have been considerably higher.131 As a result, the copyright owners of musical 
works came to believe they would benefit if the rate court were allowed to consider 
the royalties paid for sound recordings.132 The MWMA responds to these concerns 
by replacing § 114(i) with a new provision that permits the rate court to consider 
sound recording performance royalties when setting or adjusting public perfor-
mance royalties for the streaming of musical works.133 
B. Title II: The CLASSICS Protection and Access Act 
The second major component of the MMA is the CLASSICS Act, which ad-
dresses the lack of federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings.134 According 
to the House Report, the purpose of the CLASSICS Act is to assist “older artists 
who have highlighted the negative impact upon their ability to survive economically 
as they increasingly enter their retirement years.”135 As discussed below, the new 
law offers significant benefits to record labels and recording artists who own rights 
in these recordings. However, it also creates ambiguities and potential conflicts with 
other provisions in federal law. 
i. Scope of Rights in Pre-1972 Recordings 
Under the original House and Senate bills, the CLASSICS Act would have 
given pre-1972 sound recordings only a digital audio transmission right,136 falling 
far short of the recommendation of the Copyright Office to grant them full federal 
copyright protection.137 At the last minute, however, without further hearings or 
floor debates, the final bill was revised to create the near-equivalent of full federal 
copyright protection. Rather than simply amending the existing copyright statutes 
to include pre-1972 recordings, the CLASSICS Act adds a new Chapter 14 to Title 
17—consisting of a single section, § 1401—that details the scope and duration of 
protection for these works.138 
In general, § 1401 gives the owner of the rights in a pre-1972 sound recording 
the same exclusive rights and infringement remedies as the owner of a copyrighted 
                                                          
 130. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 42, 104–05. 
 131. Ari Herstand, Songwriters are One Step Closer to Higher Royalties, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (May 
15, 2014), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014/05/15/songwriters-one-step-closer-higher-royal-
ties/. 
 132. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 57, at 104–05; H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, 
at 14 (discussing parallel provision in one of the MMA’s predecessor bills, H.R. 5447). 
 133. MMA § 103(b)-(c) (2018). 
 134. Id. §§ 201-02. 
 135. H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 15 (2018) (reporting on one of the MMA’s predecessor bills, H.R. 5447, 
115th Cong. (2018)). 
 136. MMA § 202(a) (2018). 
 137. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 
175 (2011), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [hereinafter COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION].  
 138. MMA § 202(a)(2) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018)). 
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sound recording.139 These rights include the exclusive rights under §§ 106 and 602 
as well as the right to pursue actions for violations of §§ 1201 and 1202.140 In gen-
eral, these rights are subject to the same exceptions and limitations that apply to 
copyrighted sound recordings.141 In particular, the § 114(d) provisions on exempt 
transmissions142 and the statutory license for non-interactive digital audio transmis-
sions143 both apply, as does the § 112(e) statutory license144 that permits ephemeral 
copying of a sound recording for the purpose of these transmissions.145 In addition, 
the § 512 safe harbor for internet intermediaries that host user-provided content also 
applies to pre-1972 recordings, thus ending the split of authority on whether the safe 
harbor protects intermediaries from state law claims for infringement of pre-1972 
recordings.146 
However, the exclusive rights in pre-1972 recordings are subject to one addi-
tional limitation that does not apply to copyrighted sound recordings, and which 
appears to have the purpose of encouraging educational and other noncommercial 
uses of older recordings that are no longer commercially available. In effect, this is 
an “orphan works” provision.147 If a pre-1972 recording is not being commercially 
exploited by, or under the authority of, the rights owner, then another party can 
make noncommercial use of that recording under certain conditions.148 First, the 
user must have been unable, after a good faith, reasonable search, to find the sound 
                                                          
 139. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(1) (granting the rights owner the full array of remedies under 17 U.S.C. §§ 
502–05, 1203 against anyone who engages in a “covered activity” with respect to the sound recording, 
as “covered activity” is defined in 1401(l)(1)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. These include fair use (§ 107), the library and archival exception (§ 108), the first sale rule (§ 
109), the variety of specific exceptions listed in section 110, nonprofit teaching exceptions (§§ 110(1)–
(2)), the statute of limitations (§ 507), and the DMCA safe harbors (§ 512). The § 115 compulsory license 
for reproduction and distribution of musical works in phonorecords did not require amendment. Under 
current law, it can be invoked for uses that involve duplicating a pre-1972 sound recording only if these 
uses are authorized by “any person who fixed the sound recording pursuant to an express . . . or . . . valid 
compulsory license for use of such work in a sound recording.” 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). In 
the case of copyrighted sound recordings, § 115 requires the consent of the copyright owner of the sound 
recording. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 142. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2018). 
 143. Id. § 114(d)(2). 
 144. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2004). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2018) (stating that if the user complies with the requirements of §§ 112 and 
114, the transmissions and ephemeral copies will be considered to be authorized by the owner of the pre-
1972 recording). With respect to digital audio transmissions that took place before enactment, and which 
may therefore give rise to liability under state law, compliance with these statutory licensing require-
ments can also have a preemptive effect, as defendants can terminate or avoid infringement actions under 
state law by paying the statutory royalties for all digital audio transmissions of the plaintiffs’ pre-1972 
recordings during the three years preceding enactment. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(e). 
 146. Compare Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that safe 
harbor applies to recordings protected by New York law), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1374 (2017), with 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (the 
Grooveshark case) (reaching opposite conclusion), and COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, supra note 137, at 130 
(also concluding that safe harbor does not apply). 
 147. The term “orphan work” generally refers to copyrighted works with respect to which it is difficult 
to identify and contact the copyright owner(s), thus making it difficult to obtain permission to exploit 
the works. Typically, these tend to be older works. See, e.g., Dinusha Menis, Orphan Works, 
COPYRIGHTUSER.ORG, https://www.copyrightuser.org/understand/exceptions/orphan-works/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 16, 2018). 
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(c). 
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recording either in the files of the Copyright Office or “on services offering a com-
prehensive set of sound recordings for sale or streaming.”149 Second, the user must 
file a notice of the intended use with the Copyright Office.150 At this point, the rights 
owner has 90 days in which to notify the Copyright Office that it is “opting out” of 
the proposed noncommercial use.151 If the rights owner does not opt out, then the 
noncommercial use may proceed.152 
Thus, apart from the noncommercial use exception, the new law gives the rights 
owners of pre-1972 sound recordings most of the same rights and remedies that 
apply to copyrighted sound recordings. Yet, in spite of this, the new law expressly 
denies that pre-1972 sound recordings are protected by copyright. In a bizarre twist, 
the CLASSICS Act states that “no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, 
shall be subject to copyright under this title.”153 For this reason, § 1401 consistently 
refers to the owner of exclusive rights in a pre-1972 sound recording as the “rights 
owner” rather than the copyright owner. 
It is not clear why Congress chose to grant these recordings almost all of the 
protections of copyright law while still formalistically refusing to call this copyright 
protection. Prior to its repeal by the CLASSICS Act, § 301(c) stated that “no sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this 
title before, on, or after February 15, 2067.”154 If Congress viewed this as a com-
mitment the reversal of which might lead to a legal challenge, simply using a dif-
ferent word to describe a nearly equivalent federal right is unlikely to defeat such a 
challenge. 
Section 1401 thus treats pre-1972 sound recordings much like copyrighted 
sound recordings but technically withholds copyright protection. As discussed be-
low, there are, indeed, some differences between the rights granted by § 1401 and 
those granted to other copyrighted works. These add complexity and ambiguity to 
the statute without advancing any particular policy goals. 
ii. Preemption 
Although the wording of the new preemption provision is ambiguous, it seems 
clear that Congress intended the new federal protections for pre-1972 sound record-
ings to preempt most, but not all, of the state laws providing copyright-like protec-
tion to these recordings. Prior to amendment by the CLASSICS Act, § 301(c) of the 
1976 Act stated that federal copyright laws would not preempt state laws protecting 
pre-1972 sound recordings until February 15, 2067.155 However, the CLASSICS 
Act repeals that provision and provides instead that, on a prospective basis, the gen-
eral preemption provisions of § 301(a) apply to “activities” involving pre-1972 re-
cordings.156 Although the intent is apparently to preempt most state laws providing 
the equivalent of copyright protection to pre-1972 recordings, the manner in which                                                           
 149. Id. § 1401(c)(1)(A). Although pre-1972 recordings are not eligible for copyright registration under 
17 U.S.C. § 408, the new law allows rights owners to file certain information with the Copyright Office. 
See infra notes 192–99 and accompanying text. 17 U.S.C. §1401(f)(5). 
 150. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(c)(1)(B). 
 151. Id. § 1401(c)(1)(C). 
 152. Id. 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2018). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (pre-MMA). 
 155. Id. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). 
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this is expressed is confusing. Under § 301(a), Title 17 provides exclusive protec-
tion with respect to “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . in works . . . [that] come 
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by [§§] 102 and 103.”157 Because 
the CLASSICS Act clearly states that pre-1972 recordings are not within the subject 
matter of copyright,158 § 301(a) by its own terms does not apply to those works.159 
To interpret the statute literally would frustrate Congress’s apparent intent. Unless 
Congress makes a technical correction, courts will have to choose between giving 
effect to the statutory language or giving effect to Congress’s probable intent. 
Assuming that courts interpret the new preemption provision in a way that ef-
fectuates Congress’s intent, federal law still will not entirely preempt state laws that 
protect pre-1972 sound recordings. This is because the new preemption provision 
of the CLASSICS Act expressly does not “affirm or negate” the preemption of state 
law claims arising from the “nonsubscription broadcast transmission of sound re-
cordings . . . for activities that” are not covered by the exclusive rights of § 1401 
during the period that § 1401 protects those recordings; instead, § 301(c) specifies 
that the analysis of federal preemption with respect to such broadcasts remains the 
same as it was before the CLASSICS Act.160 Adding to the confusion, § 1401(e)(3) 
expressly states: “Nothing in this section may be construed to recognize or negate 
the existence of public performance rights in sound recordings under the laws of 
any State.” 161 This convoluted treatment of the preemption question gives rise to 
several ambiguities. 
First, because it does not either “affirm or negate” the preemption of state law 
claims for broadcast transmissions of sound recordings, the CLASSICS Act gives 
courts no guidance on whether such state law claims can proceed. Instead, it ex-
pressly leaves prior law unchanged.162 Second, it is not clear whether this agnosti-
cism on broadcast transmissions is limited to pre-1972 sound recordings, thus leav-
ing open the possibility that states could recognize exclusive broadcast rights in 
copyrighted recordings as well as in pre-1972 recordings. Third, due to the conflict-
ing language of §§ 301(c) and 1401(e)(3), it is unclear whether the CLASSICS Act 
preempts state laws addressing public performances of sound recordings that in-
volve neither terrestrial broadcasts nor digital audio transmissions, but instead take 
place in venues open to the public. These would include, for example, public per-
formances in concert halls, stadiums, restaurants, bars, clubs, gyms, and retail 
stores.  
                                                          
 157. Id. § 301(a). 
 158. Id. § 301(c). 
 159. The drafters were careless in carrying over problematic language from § 301(c) of the 1976 Act, 
which stated that § 301(a) would apply to state law protections for pre-1972 recordings with respect to 
undertakings commenced on or after February 15, 2067, even though federal copyright would not apply. 
Since no preemption issue would arise until 2067, there was never a need to litigate or clarify this lan-
guage. 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). 
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(e)(3). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (“Any potential preemption of rights and remedies related to such activities 
undertaken during that period [of § 1401 protection] shall apply in all respects as it did the day before” 
enactment of the CLASSICS Act.). The post-enactment explanation of the MMA that was released by 
Representative Goodlatte indicates that any non-preempted state protections for “over-the-air” broad-
casts “will expire at the same time federal protection expires” under the CLASSICS Act. H.R. 1551, THE 
MUSIC MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 87, at 15. 
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To the extent that states retain the authority to regulate at least some public 
performances of pre-1972 sound recordings after the CLASSICS Act, the new law 
does not eliminate the potential for a patchwork of conflicting state laws regulating 
terrestrial broadcasts and non-broadcast public performances of those recordings. 
This leaves the door open for continuing litigation by rights owners seeking royal-
ties under state law when their recordings are performed on the radio, on television, 
or in venues open to the public. 
iii. Term of Protection 
Earlier versions of the CLASSICS Act protected all sound recordings created 
between 1922 and February 15, 1972 until February 15, 2067.163 Even though these 
earlier bills provided only a digital audio transmission right, this term of protection 
proved controversial. During the House and Senate hearings on the CLASSICS Act, 
several advocacy groups objected to across-the-board protection lasting until 2067 
because, for older pre-1972 recordings, the new digital right would outlast the term 
of federal copyright they would have received had they been eligible for such pro-
tection in the first place.164 For example, if a sound recording released in 1940 had 
been eligible for federal copyright protection at the time, then its copyright would 
expire no later than 2035.165 In contrast, the proposed digital audio transmission 
right would last until 2067.166 
Even as the final bill greatly broadened the scope of protection for these re-
cordings beyond the original proposals, it significantly reduced the duration of that 
protection. Section 1401 now provides laddered terms of protection, depending on 
the age of the recording. All pre-1972 recordings receive at least 95 years of federal 
protection, measured from their year of first publication;167 this is similar (although 
not identical) to the current copyright term for other published works from that pe-
riod.168 For some older works, however, this 95-year term will already have expired 
                                                          
 163. See, e.g., S. 2823, 115th Cong. § 202(a) (2018) (referencing § 1401(a)). 
 164. Letter from Jonathan Band, Counsel, Library Copyright All., to Darrell Issa, Chairman, & Jerry 
Nadler, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet (Aug. 9, 2017) (on file with 
the Library Copyright Alliance) (arguing that protection should end 95 years after publication); Letter 
from Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge, to Chuck Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, et al. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/documents/public-
knowledge-letter-on-music-modernization-act; Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public Knowledge 
Urges Senate to Consider Music Modernization Act and CLASSICS Act Separately (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/public-knowledge-urges-senate-to-consider-music-
modernization-act-and-class (arguing that § 1401 “creates a ‘faux copyright’ that locks these recordings 
behind federal protection until 2067, nearly a century and a half after many of them were made”). 
 165. Some of the advocacy statements measured the 95-year copyright term from the date of creation, 
while others used the date of publication. Band, supra note 164 (arguing that protection should end 95 
years after publication). For most sound pre-1972 recordings, the difference is probably insignificant. 
However, under the 1909 Act, the starting date for copyright protection of most works was the date of 
publication. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077, repealed by Copyright 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
 166. S. 2823 § 202(a) (referring to § 1401(a)). The end date of February 15, 2067 was not chosen at 
random. Prior to amendment by the MMA, § 301(c) of the 1976 Act specified that state laws protecting 
sound recordings would not be preempted until that date, which is exactly 95 years from February 15, 
1972, the date on which sound recordings became eligible for federal copyright. See generally 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, supra note 137. 
 167. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (2018). 
 168. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2002) (providing for initial and renewal terms totaling 95 years). 
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by the effective date of the CLASSICS Act (October 11, 2018), or it may expire 
shortly thereafter. Therefore, in addition to the 95-year term, § 1401 grants each 
recording an additional term of years, depending in large part on the recording’s 
year of publication: 
 Recordings first published before 1923 receive an additional term 
ending 3 years after enactment (that is, 2021); 
 Recordings first published between 1923 and 1946 receive 5 years in 
addition to 95, for a total term of 100 years; 
 Recordings first published between 1947 and 1956 receive 15 years 
in addition to 95, for a total term of 110 years; and 
 Recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 (but not described above) 
are protected until February 15, 2067.169  
Because this durational provision grants protection to sound recordings pub-
lished before 1923, it protects recordings that would have already entered the public 
domain if they had been eligible for federal copyright protection when they were 
first published. By contrast, other types of works published before 1923—including 
musical compositions as well as works of art and literature—have already entered 
the public domain.170 While the sound recordings falling into this category are prob-
ably few in number, with more historical than commercial value, the extension of 
protection is nonetheless noteworthy. 
iv. Ownership 
Because the CLASSICS Act expressly does not grant copyright protection to 
pre-1972 recordings, it refers to the owners of the exclusive rights under § 1401 as 
“rights owners” rather than copyright owners.171 But who are these rights owners? 
Surprisingly, § 1401 does not directly answer this question. Instead, it defers largely 
to state law.172 In doing so, it creates significant and unnecessary uncertainty. 
Section 1401 defines the “rights owner” of a pre-1972 recording as “the person 
that has the exclusive right to reproduce a sound recording under the laws of any 
State, as of the day before enactment,” or any person to whom “a right to enforce a 
violation of this section may be transferred” after the enactment date.173 The refer-
ence to “the laws of any State”174 creates the possibility of conflicting ownership 
                                                          
 169. Id. 
 170. Under § 23 of the 1909 Act, a work published in 1922 received, at most, 56 years of protection. 
Under § 304(a)(2) of the 1976 Act (prior to its amendment in 1998), that work received an additional 19 
years of protection. This total of 75 years of protection expired in 1997, meaning that the work’s copy-
right did not receive the benefit of the additional 20 years added by § 102 of the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (giving a total term of 95 years of 
protection to works still in their renewal terms on the Act’s effective date). 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(a). 
 172. Id. § 1401. 
 173. Id. § 1401(l)(2). 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
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claims based on the laws of different states. With respect to any given sound re-
cording, there is no guarantee that state laws will be uniform in their assessment of 
who owns the reproduction right. State laws may vary with respect to the initial 
ownership of those rights at the time the recording was made, and also with respect 
to whether those rights have since been validly assigned or exclusively licensed. 
Given the unsettled nature of state copyright laws, in some cases the issue of own-
ership may have to be resolved through costly litigation. 
At the time a particular sound recording was created, the reproduction rights 
could have vested (1) solely in the record label, (2) jointly in some combination of 
the performers, producer, sound engineer, and/or other creative participants, or (3) 
jointly in the record label and some of the creative participants.175 To make this 
determination today, a court would have to determine what authorship and/or own-
ership rules were in place under state law at the time the recording was fixed.176 In 
many states, this will present a novel question of law. Additionally, the outcome of 
this analysis could vary under the laws of different states, which creates a conflict 
of laws problem. For purposes of § 1401, should the initial ownership of the right 
be determined only under the law of the state where the recording was made? While 
this answer makes sense in terms of policy, it conflicts with § 1401’s statement that 
ownership can be based on “the laws of any State.”177 
A second concern relates to assignments and licenses. Regardless of which 
state’s law determines the initial vesting of the reproduction right with respect to a 
particular recording, it is possible that the right has subsequently been assigned or 
licensed. To identify the current owner of the reproduction right, it may be neces-
sary to resolve disputes over whether that right has been assigned or exclusively 
licensed. Once again, variation in state laws may lead to divergent answers on the 
question of whether a purported assignment or exclusive license was valid at the 
time it was executed, and whether an exclusive licensee of the reproduction right is 
the “owner” of that right under state law.178 Due to the relatively undeveloped nature 
of state copyright laws, this is likely to be a novel question in many states. 
While § 1401 appears to defer entirely to state law on the validity of assign-
ments and licenses that take effect prior to the enactment date, it does address the 
validity of transfers that occur after enactment. Even here, though, it leaves many 
unanswered questions. Section 1401 recognizes as a rights owner “any person to 
which a right to enforce a violation of this section may be transferred, in whole or 
in part, after the date of enactment” pursuant to §§ 201(d), 201(e), and 204 of the 
Copyright Act.179 Although the listed provisions apply specifically to transfers of 
                                                          
 175. Cf. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
375 (2002) (addressing comparable issues under federal law). 
 176. See Stern v. Lavender, No. 16 Civ. 9886 (PAE), 2018 WL 3520497, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 20, 
2018). See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1401 (measuring ownership throughout the statute as the date of fixation). 
Although the date of fixation is the most likely date on which authorship and initial ownership would be 
determined (as is the rule under federal law), even this is not a foregone conclusion under state law. 
 177. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(l)(2) (emphasis added). By assigning ownership of the § 1401 rights to the owner 
of the reproduction right, the CLASSICS Act also seems to overlook the possibility that, even before 
the enactment date, some of the rights encompassed by § 1401 might have been transferred separately 
from the reproduction rights. If all of the § 1401 rights belong to the owner of the reproduction rights on 
the enactment date, this would frustrate the reasonable expectations of a party to whom the distribution, 
adaptation, or digital audio transmission rights had been assigned or exclusively licensed. 
 178. See James H. Neu, Rights of Copyright Owner, 17 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 384–91 (1942). 
 179. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1401(h)(1)(A), (l)(2)(B) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)-(e) (1978); 17 U.S.C. § 204 
(1976)). 
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“copyright” or the exclusive rights thereunder, it appears that Congress intends for 
them to govern transfers of § 1401 rights as well. Section 204 requires copyright 
transfers to be in writing; accordingly, transfers of § 1401 rights must be in writing 
as well. Section 1401 is silent, however, on the question of what, if any, additional 
rules apply to transfers of exclusive rights. For example, does an exclusive licensee 
qualify as a rights owner? Is specific language required for an assignment or exclu-
sive license to be valid? If there are multiple authors or multiple owners of the sound 
recording, how many of them must join in an assignment or exclusive license? And, 
how many of them must consent to allow a third party to exercise their § 1401 
rights? All of this uncertainty could have been avoided if Congress had subjected 
pre-1972 recordings to the federal provisions on ownership of copyrights. 
v. Termination Rights 
One of the most significant consequences of Congress’s decision to treat the § 
1401 rights as something other than copyright is that assignments and licenses of 
the rights are not subject to a termination right. For works protected by federal cop-
yright, authors (or, in some cases, their heirs) can ordinarily terminate a license or 
assignment after a specified term of years.180 However, because the termination pro-
visions apply only to copyrights, they do not apply to the § 1401 rights. Because § 
1401 itself is silent on termination rights, the logical conclusion is that no such 
rights exist. 
Because the exclusive rights in some of these recordings will endure for dec-
ades into the future, if the rights have already been assigned by the original authors 
to their record labels, the absence of a termination right gives the entire benefit of 
this windfall to the labels. Yet, Congress’s stated intent was to benefit the recording 
artists themselves.181 In contrast, when Congress has previously extended the term 
of copyright protection, it has always ensured that the benefit of that extension 
would accrue to the authors (or their families) rather than to assignees or licensees. 
For example, when the 1976 Act added 19 years to the renewal term of works pub-
lished under the 1909 Act, Congress gave authors the right to terminate their grants 
in time to reclaim the 19-year extension.182 It did the same thing in the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), which added an additional 20 years to 
subsisting copyright terms.183 Even the unitary copyright term under the 1976 Act 
includes an author’s termination right that can be exercised 35 to 40 years after the 
copyright is assigned or licensed.184 These termination rights apply to all copy-
righted works except for works made for hire.185 
Depending on state laws, the author(s), and thus the original rights-holder(s), 
of a pre-1972 sound recording could be one or more of the following, in various 
combinations: the original record label, the recording artist(s) who performed on 
                                                          
 180. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)-(d) (2002) (providing termination provisions). 
 181. H.R. REP. NO. 115-651 at 15–16 (2018) (discussing a similar provision in H.R. 5447, a predecessor 
bill, and indicating Congress’s intent to enrich the original recording artist rather than any subsequent 
rights owner). 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2002). 
 183. Id. § 304(d). 
 184. Id. § 203(a)(3). 
 185. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d). 
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the recording, the producer, or other free-lance contributors.186 At the time the orig-
inal rights-owner licensed or assigned the reproduction right under state law, neither 
party to the transaction could have anticipated that a sale of the right to copy and 
sell the recording under state law would also convey the near-equivalent of federal 
copyright ownership, or that it would entail a digital streaming right. Accordingly, 
a termination right seems necessary to ensure that the benefit of the new right flows 
to the creator(s) of the work, consistent with Congress’s stated intent.187 By failing 
to provide a termination right, § 1401 conclusively treats all pre-1972 sound record-
ings as the state-law equivalent of works made for hire under federal law, an as-
sumption that may be true for some recordings but not others.188 
In the absence of a federal termination right, some states might consider adopt-
ing their own termination rights. This would be effective under the statute, because 
§ 1401 defers to state law in order to determine ownership. However, introducing a 
termination right after the term of protection and ownership rights have been estab-
lished could raise constitutional concerns as a violation of due process. 
vi. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
While federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims, this 
may not be the case for claims under § 1401. Federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction over claims “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . or 
copyrights,”189 as well as Title 17 actions pertaining to semiconductor chips and 
boat hull designs.190 Because § 1401 does not involve patents, semiconductor chips, 
or boat hull designs, and because Congress took pains to make clear that § 1401 
does not provide copyright protection,191 claims arising under § 1401 fall into none 
of the categories over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, 
it would appear that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. If Congress did not 
intend this result, then this will require a technical correction. Otherwise, rights 
owners will have the option of filing their claims in state court. 
vii. Registration 
Because pre-1972 sound recordings are not copyrighted, they are apparently 
not eligible for federal registration. The registration statute, § 408 of the Copyright 
Act, allows registration only “during the subsistence” of a copyright,192 which sug-
gests that a work cannot be registered if it does not have a copyright term. On the 
other hand, the same provision permits “the owner of copyright or of any exclusive 
                                                          
 186. See Part IV.B.iv. 
 187. See Meredith Filak Rose, A Payday Built on Bad Policy, PUB. KNOWLEDGE: MUSIC LICENSING 
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/a-payday-built-on-bad-policy. 
 188. Cf. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08 CIV. 6143(DLC), 2010 
WL 3564258 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010) (applying highly fact-specific inquiry to determine whether Bob 
Marley’s sound recordings were works made for hire for purposes of renewal rights under the 1909 Act). 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2011). 
 190. Id. Semiconductor chips and boat hull designs are the subjects of Chapters 9 and 13, respectively, 
in Title 17. 
 191. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2018). 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005). 
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right” to register the work.193 Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the correct answer 
appears to be that registration is not permitted. Works protected under chapter 9 
(semiconductor chips) are expressly eligible for registration,194 and registration is 
mandatory for boat hull designs under chapter 13.195 Therefore, Congress’s failure 
to provide for registration in § 1401 suggests that pre-1972 recordings are not eli-
gible.196  
However, the CLASSICS Act provides an alternative filing system, under 
which the rights owner may file “a schedule that specifies the title, artist, and rights 
owners of the sound recording” with the Copyright Office.197 A person who seeks 
to invoke the statutory privilege for noncommercial uses of pre-1972 recordings 
must conduct a good faith, reasonable search of these schedules.198 Since this filing 
is a prerequisite to collecting statutory damages and attorney’s fees with respect to 
unauthorized uses of pre-1972 recordings,199 it is a partial substitute for copyright 
registration. In contrast, § 1401 makes clear that registration is not a prerequisite to 
bringing suit or to receiving an award of statutory damages or attorney’s fees.200 
viii. Conflicts with § 104A 
Section 1401 also creates multiple conflicts with § 104A,201 under which many 
pre-1972 sound recordings first published outside the United States (“restored 
works”) already enjoy federal copyright protection. Under § 104A, federal copy-
right protection became available as early as 1996 for most pre-1972 sound record-
ings that (1) have at least one author or rights-holder that was a foreign national at 
the time of creation, (2) were first published in a foreign country and not published 
in the United States until more than 30 days later, and (3) had not yet entered the 
public domain in their countries of origin.202 Those copyrights will expire no later 
                                                          
 193. Id. When § 408 was drafted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976, the reference to “any exclusive 
right” could only have referred to the exclusive rights in copyrighted works, because Title 17 recognized 
no other exclusive rights at that time. 
 194. 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (1984). 
 195. 17 U.S.C. § 1310(a) (1998). 
 196.  This conclusion is supported by § 1401(h), which allows rights owners to bring suit without reg-
istering their recordings. Id. § 1401(h)(1)(B) (2018). It is also consistent with language in Representa-
tive Goodlatte’s post-enactment explanation:  
[F]ormalities such as the copyright notice, deposit and registration provisions of chapter 4 do not 
apply to this new sui generis right but rather are replaced with different processes and provisions 
more applicable to pre-1972 recordings. Pre-1972 recordings have existed and been commercially 
exploited for many decades without compliance with such formalities, and it would not be feasible 
to apply those formalities now. 
H.R. 1551, THE MUSIC MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 87, at 15. 
 197. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(5)(A)(i)(I)(2018). 
 198. Id. § 1401(c)(1)(A)(i). See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text for a discussion on the   
noncommercial use privilege. 
 199. Id. § 1401(f)(5)(A)(i).  
 200. Id. §§ 1401(f)(5)(C), (h)(1)(B). 
 201. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2002). 
202. Section 104A extends federal copyright protection to pre-1972 recordings that were first published 
in countries that are partners with the U.S. in various copyright and trade agreements. 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(3), (h)(6)(C)(2). This encompasses the vast majority of foreign-made pre-1972 sound record-
ings. For countries that adhered to the Berne Convention or were members of the World Trade Organi-
zation as of January 1, 1996, their pre-1972 recordings became eligible for U.S. copyright protection on 
that date. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2). 
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than 95 years from publication, and many of them earlier.203 Therefore, they receive 
essentially the same protection as works first published in the United States. 
On its face, § 1401 applies to all pre-1972 sound recordings, without regard to 
authorship, place of first publication, or current copyright status. This sets up an 
obvious conflict. Either Congress will have to make a technical correction to ex-
clude restored works from § 1401, or courts will have to determine whether restored 
works are subject to the new provisions. If § 1401 applies to restored works, then 
many of them will enjoy longer copyright terms than they are afforded under § 
104A. For example, if a sound recording by a foreign national was first published 
in Europe in 1950, under § 104A that recording has a federal copyright term of 95 
years, expiring in 2045. If § 1401 applies, however, that recording will be protected 
for 110 years204—until 2060. In addition, some foreign recordings may have entered 
the public domain in their countries of origin before becoming eligible for copyright 
under § 104A, in which case they did not receive any federal copyright protec-
tion.205 It is unclear whether § 1401 would protect a foreign recording that never 
qualified for federal copyright protection and is no longer copyrighted in its country 
of origin. Nothing in the legislative history of § 1401 suggests that Congress in-
tended to grant a copyright extension for such recordings, yet that is the inescapable 
result of applying this provision to all pre-1972 sound recordings, regardless of their 
current copyright status.   
A second conflict between § 1401 and § 104A relates to ownership rights. Un-
der § 1401, ownership rights in pre-1972 sound recordings are determined “under 
the laws of any State.”206 In contrast, § 104A provides that “[a] restored work vests 
initially in the author or initial right holder of the work as determined by the law of 
the source country of the work.”207 Thus, if a pre-1972 sound recording was first 
released outside of the United States, there are two conflicting rules for determining 
the initial owner of § 1401 rights: (1) the owner is the person who owns the repro-
duction right under the law of “any State,” regardless of the place of creation, or (2) 
the owner is the author or initial rights-holder under the law of the country where 
the recording was first released. While there may be few instances in which the 
inconsistent rules lead to conflicting ownership claims, the relative precision of § 
104A highlights the careless drafting in § 1401. 
Pre-1972 recordings that are copyrighted under § 104A are also subject to the 
termination provisions of the 1976 Act. Since those provisions do not seem to apply 
                                                          
 203. Pre-1972 foreign recordings that had already entered the public domain in their country of origin 
due to expiration of copyright received no federal protection. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6). Other pre-1972 
foreign recordings received federal protection for the remainder of the copyright term they would have 
been granted if they had been eligible. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B). For those published between 1909 
and 1977, the copyright term was 75 years from publication. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1) (2002) (before 
amendment by § 102(d) of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, 112 Stat. 2827)). If they were still under copyright in 1998, their total term became 95 years from 
publication. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1). 
 204. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2). 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B) (denying restoration of federal copyright to a work that entered the 
public domain in its country of origin before the restoration date). A foreign recording made in 1930 
most likely entered the public domain in its country of origin by 1980, and thus would have received no 
federal copyright protection under § 104A. It is unclear whether § 1401 would grant a digital audio 
transmission right to a foreign recording that never qualified for federal copyright restoration and is no 
longer copyrighted in its country of origin. 
 206. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(g). See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 207. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b). 
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to works protected under § 1401, an attempt to terminate an assignment or license 
in a recording copyrighted under § 104A would not be valid if § 1401 applies. 
ix. Benefits to Recording Artists 
According to the House Report, the purpose of the CLASSICS Act is to assist 
“older artists who have highlighted the negative impact upon their ability to survive 
economically as they increasingly enter their retirement years.”208 To fulfill this 
purpose, the benefits of § 1401 should flow to the recording artists. However, as 
discussed below, this will be true only in part. 
One of the most valuable rights protected by § 1401 is the digital audio trans-
mission right. Section 1401 makes pre-1972 recordings subject to the rules of § 
114—the same rules that govern digital streaming of copyrighted sound record-
ings.209 Under these rules, if the streaming of a pre-1972 recording complies with 
the requirements of § 114, then the royalty payments will also be dictated by § 
114.210 This means that recording artists, like record labels, will receive no royalties 
at all from “exempt transmissions.”211 In the case of non-exempt transmissions that 
are non-interactive, the featured recording artists will receive only 45% of the stat-
utory royalty, because 50% goes to the record label.212 This is the only streaming 
revenue that the law guarantees for artists. In contrast, for interactive transmissions, 
the artist’s share of the streaming royalty will depend on (1) the deal negotiated 
between the label and the streaming service and (2) the terms of the artist’s record-
ing contract.213 Both of these factors may be problematic. 
Even in the case of copyrighted sound recordings, record labels have some-
times taken equity interests in interactive streaming services in place of larger roy-
alties, thus reducing any royalty pool to which their artists are contractually enti-
tled.214 For pre-1972 recordings, however, the terms of the artist’s recording con-
tract may present an additional problem. Recall that, prior to the MMA, pre-1972 
recordings were protected only by state laws.215 In most states, protection was based 
on judicial interpretation of the common law doctrines of unfair competition, mis-
appropriation, and the right of publicity, and encompassed, at most, copying and 
distribution.216 Although some states have clarified their protection for sound re-
cordings more recently,217 recording artists entering into contracts during the pre-
1972 period would not have foreseen those developments. Even today, there are no 
                                                          
 208. H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 15 (2018) (reporting on one of the MMA’s predecessor bills, H.R. 5447, 
97th Cong. (1983)). 
 209. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2018). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. § 114(d)(1). 
 212. Id. § 114(g) (2). The remaining 5% is split between the nonfeatured vocalists and musicians. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major Labels Love Spotify, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17/major-labels-
spotify. 
 215. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 216. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, supra note 137, at 20–49; PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. AND INTELL. PROP., 
WASH. COLL. OF LAW, AM. UNIV., PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS UNDER STATE LAW 
AND ITS IMPACT ON USE BY NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: A 10-STATE ANALYSIS 1 (2009); Marketa Trim-
ble, U.S. State Copyright Laws: Challenge and Potential, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 66, 113–16 (2017). 
 217. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005); see also 
Trimble, supra note 216, at 115–16. 
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state laws that recognize digital audio transmission rights in sound recordings, ei-
ther prospectively or retroactively.218 Thus, at the time these artists signed their con-
tracts, neither the artist nor the label was likely to have contemplated streaming or 
analogous rights. Therefore, the literal terms of the artists’ recording contracts prob-
ably do not entitle them to any share of sound recording performance royalties from 
interactive streaming.219 
It is highly unlikely that the artist’s contract for a pre-1972 recording included 
language calling for a public performance royalty or anything else that might be 
construed as a digital streaming royalty.220 Copies of pre-1972 recording contracts 
are difficult to find. However, a look at contracts from the 1980s—still predating 
the enactment of § 106(6)—suggests that these older contracts did not address pub-
lic performance rights because they had no reason to do so. For example, the royalty 
clause in a 1983 recording contract between CBS (Sony’s predecessor) and the band 
Toto contains detailed provisions on royalties from record sales, but no other roy-
alty provisions.221 In contrast, a 1989 contract between the Allman Brothers and 
CBS includes a clause stating that, “if legislation requiring the payment of copyright 
royalties for the public performance of Phonograph Records is enacted,” and if CBS 
receives such royalties, it will pay the artist whatever share is required under CBS’s 
collective bargaining agreement with the American Federation of Musicians.222 
Based on examination of these post-1972 contracts, it will likely be difficult to find 
language in a pre-1972 contract supporting a recording artist’s claim to a share of 
streaming royalties, much less quantifying that share. 
As is true with copyrighted recordings, § 1401 will not require the payment of 
royalties for public performances of pre-1972 recordings on terrestrial radio or in 
public venues such as bars, clubs, and restaurants.223 While § 1401 arguably leaves 
room for state laws to fill this gap, there is currently no indication that they will do 
so.224 Fortunately for rights-owners, the last-minute expansion of § 1401 to encom-
pass rights equivalent to all of the exclusive rights held by sound recording copy-
right owners should bring in additional royalties from physical sales, downloads, 
and master use licenses. Some of these activities would have been foreseeable at 
the time recording artists entered their contracts with record labels, and, therefore, 
may be the subject of royalty clauses in those contracts. 
                                                          
 218. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2016); Flo & Eddie, 
Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 827 F.3d 1016, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, 
Inc., 851 F.3d 950, 951 (9th Cir. 2017); see also COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, supra note 137, at 45. 
 219. If they are also songwriters, of course, they may receive mechanical and public performance roy-
alties for the streaming of recordings that embody their compositions. See supra notes 6–8 and accom-
panying text. 
 220. They certainly would not refer to digital transmission rights, a technical term that would have had 
no meaning at that time, and which refers to a technology that did not exist at that time. 
 221. Toto 1983 Recording Contract with CBS (Sony), § 9 at 12–16, http://www.scribd.com/docu-
ment/293930144/toto-1983-recording-contract-w-cbs-sony (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 222. Allman Brothers Record Contract with CBS (1989), § 10.4 at 22, http://www.scribd.com/docu-
ment/293930010/Allman-Bros-Record-Contract-w-CBS-1989 (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 223. See supra Part IV.B.ii. 
 224. See supra Part IV.B.ii. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The MMA introduces several important reforms to federal copyright protection 
of sound recordings. In particular, the MWMA’s creation of an improved process 
for administering mechanical licenses and setting mechanical licensing rates should 
increase the likelihood that songwriters and music publishers will receive the com-
pensation to which they are legally entitled. The mandate to create a publicly acces-
sible music database will lead to the creation of an essential resource which, in con-
junction with ongoing efforts in other countries, can expand to include a worldwide 
repertoire linking recordings to their underlying musical works and to all the crea-
tive participants who may be entitled to share in the proceeds of those works. 
The CLASSICS Act is a significant improvement over the 1976 Act and the 
1971 SRA, under which the protection of pre-1972 American sound recordings was 
left entirely to a patchwork of poorly developed state laws.225 However, while the 
CLASSICS Act resolves some important issues, it introduces unnecessary ambigu-
ity by relying on state law to determine the identity of the rights-owner. In addition, 
if the true purpose of the CLASSICS Act is “to enable older artists and their families 
to benefit financially from their creativity,”226 the Act shows a lack of imagination. 
By subjecting pre-1972 recordings to the same § 114 royalty scheme as copyrighted 
recordings, and by not giving the recording artists any termination rights, the Act 
ensures that the lion’s share of the financial rewards from the newly recognized 
right will go to the record labels rather than the artists. 
Additional drafting problems create ambiguity over the extent to which state 
copyright laws are preempted, the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and the 
copyright status of pre-1972 sound recordings that have already received copyright 
protection under §104A. If these problems are not addressed through technical cor-
rections, they could lead to wasteful litigation. 
Finally, the MMA does not address the serious problem of hosting sites such 
as YouTube—the largest music streaming service in the world. However, this prob-
lem goes well beyond what Congress could have hoped to accomplish in the MMA. 
As Congress continues its work on modernizing copyright law, the music industry 
will almost certainly continue to pressure lawmakers to reconsider the scope of the 
safe harbors that enable sites like YouTube to generate significant advertising rev-
enues from music and sound recordings, while paying little or nothing to the copy-
right owners and recording artists. While the MMA enables songwriters, publishers, 
and recording artists to realize greater returns from licensed uses of their works, it 
leaves the challenge of unlicensed uses for another day. 
                                                          
 225. See supra Part II.A. 
 226. H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 15 (2018). 
29
LaFrance: Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
